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We revisit the issue of the emergence of fair behavior in the framework of the spatial Ultimatum game,
adding many important results and insights to the pioneering work by Page et al. [2000. The spatial
Ultimatum game. Proc. R. Soc. London B 267, 2177], who showed in a specific example that on a two
dimensional setup evolution may lead to strategies with some degree of fairness. Within this spatial
framework, we carry out a thorough simulation study and show that the emergence of altruism is a
very generic phenomenon whose details depend on the dynamics considered. A very frequent feature is
the spontaneous emergence and fixation of quasiempathetic individuals, whose offers are very close to
their acceptance thresholds. We present analytical arguments that allow an understanding of our
results and give insights on the manner in which local effects in evolution may lead to such non
rational or apparently maladaptive behaviors.1. Introduction
The evolution of cooperation and the difference between
humans and other primates are two intimately related questions
that attract a lot of interest among researchers in fields from
biology through economics to psychology. From a biological
viewpoint, understanding the emergence of cooperation is crucial
to unveil the mechanisms of the evolution of complex organisms
through the association of simpler entities (Maynard Smith and
Szathmary, 1995). On the other hand, the question is socio
economically relevant because human societies have arisen
mostly due to the readiness of humans to cooperate with non
kin even when the interaction is unlikely to take place again in
the future, or in sizeable groups (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003).
This type of behavior has been pointed out as one of the charac
teristics that set humans apart from all other animals (Kappeler
and van Schaik, 2006). Today, this topic remains a very active
field, and different mechanisms are being proposed to understand
the evolutionary origin of cooperation (Nowak, 2006).
At the roots of many cooperative behaviors in humans lies
altruism (Gintis, 2000). Altruism is defined as the capacity to
perform costly acts that confer benefits on others and, hence, it ise Sistemas Complejos (GISC),
III de Madrid, Avenida de la
.in principle detrimental for the altruistic individuals. In fact,
seemingly altruistic acts can be understood, when looked at in
depth, in terms of kin selection (Hamilton, 1964) or reciprocity
(Trivers, 1971; Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981), for instance. These
interpretations notwithstanding, there are many reports of truly
altruistic behavior in humans, in particular in experiments among
anonymous subjects that interact only once (see, e.g., Kagel and
Roth, 1995; Camerer, 2003; Fehr and Fischbacher, 2003; Henrich
et al., 2004 for reviews).
A framework that has proven itself particularly suited to
explore this issue is the Ultimatum game (Gu¨th et al., 1982).
The Ultimatum game consists of two players deciding how to
distribute a reward. One of the players, known as proposer, makes
an offer and the other player (the responder) decides whether to
accept it or not. There is only one opportunity to make a deal: If
the responder accepts, the reward is distributed between the
players according to the proposer’s offer, otherwise both players
receive nothing. Rational players’s behavior is easy to predict:
Given that any positive amount should be acceptable for the
responder, the proposer will offer such minimum quantity, which
will be accepted. On the contrary, a wealth of experimental
evidence about the Ultimatum game (Camerer, 2003; Henrich
et al., 2004) has established clearly that humans are universally
altruistic, in so far as subjects from ethnic groups all over the
world show some degree of fairness: Indeed, most proposers offer
a fair share, mean offers spanning the range from 25 to 57 percent
of the amount to be splitted. Interestingly, it is also observed1
often that unfair offers (typically below 20 percent) are rejected
many times, although there is larger variability in this respect
than in the proposers’ behavior.
A great deal of research has been devoted to understand the
origins of this behavior. One of the factors that has been proposed
to play an important role in this issue is culture (see, e.g., Gintis,
2003; Hammerstein, 2003; Oosterbeek et al., 2004; Henrich et al.,
2004; Marlowe et al., 2007) but other works point out the need to
consider the influence of genetic or biological features (Wallace
et al., 2007; Burnham, 2007). Furthermore, instances of fair
behavior related to those arising on the Ultimatum game have
been reported among non human primates (Brosnan and de
Waal, 2003; Kappeler and van Schaik, 2006) (note, however, that
rational like behavior has also been found in chimpanzees (Jensen
et al., 2007)). In fact, the Ultimatum game has indeed very direct
biological applications beyond the context of human behavior.
This is the case, e.g., of the division of parental care between the
sexes, when mate desertion has a positive effect on the deserting
individual’s reproductive success (Hammerstein, 2006). Another
situation with Ultimatum game characteristics arises when indi
viduals need to divide a reward or a prey, such as in cooperative
hunting. Thus, among chimpanzees dominant males, who did not
necessarily participate in the hunt itself, tend to end up with the
prey and control its distribution (Boesch et al., 2006). Even
outside of the realm of primates, sharing rewards or food may
lead to contexts related to the Ultimatum game, such as when fish
distribute among patches to feed (Milinski, 1984). Therefore, even
if culture may have contributed to the appearance of altruistic
behaviors in humans, these are likely to have complex causes, in
which more biological considerations should enter as well, and
more so if we think of non human animals.
In view of the above comments, explanations of non rational
actions in the Ultimatum game in evolutionary terms are very
relevant. Several such mechanisms have been proposed in the
past few years. Thus, it has been argued that if selection is rapid,
i.e., if reproduction takes place at a faster scale than interaction
among individuals, altruistic behavior may be evolutionary
selected (Sa´nchez and Cuesta, 2005). Another possible scenario
leading to large offers in the Ultimatum game is the existence of
empathy (Page and Nowak, 2000, 2002), in which players choose
as their offer the smallest amount they are willing to accept.
Finally, elaborating on ideas proposed by Nowak and May for
Prisoner’s Dilemma (Nowak and May, 1992), it was suggested
that the existence of a spatial structure could support the
appearance of altruistic behavior. The original proposal was done
by Page et al. (2000), who carried out a comparative study of the
Ultimatum game on a well mixed population, a one dimensional
system (a ring), and a sketchy analysis of two dimensional
lattices. They concluded that large offer levels, around a 34% of
the amount to share, emerged and were stable in the ring and the
lattice, while evolution converged to the rational solution on a
well mixed population. A similar result was later shown for a
generalization of the Ultimatum game to describe collaborations
by Killingback and Studer (2001). More recently, the effect of
complex (non spatial) networks of interactions was addressed
by Kuperman and Risau Gusman (2008), Eguı´luz and Tessone
(2009), and Sinatra et al. (2009), finding again that large offers
appeared in the population.
In this paper we revisit the issue of the effect of the spatial
structure on the Ultimatum game by focusing on the two
dimensional case. We largely expand the only previous work on
the subject (Page et al., 2000) by considering different dynamical
rules (possibly with noise), including the possibility of empathetic
players, and presenting detailed analytical arguments that allow
for understanding the mechanisms at work in the evolution of the
strategies.2. Model
We consider a set of agents playing the spatial Ultimatum
game, i.e., they are located on the nodes of two dimensional
square lattices and play the game only with their neighbors. Most
results have been obtained for connectivity equal to 4 (players
connected to their neighbors north, south, east and west) and size
4040. For comparison, some other simulations have been
performed with network size 1010 or larger connectivities.
We will mention on this different parameters as needed along
the paper.
Without loss of generality, the total reward will be hereafter
normalized to the unity. The strategy of every player is then
characterized by two parameters, p, qA ½0,1. The value of p
indicates the fraction of the reward offered by the player when
acting as proposer. On the other side, q denotes the acceptance
threshold, i.e., the minimum quantity that the player accepts
when acting as responder. We will study two different possibi
lities for this two parameters: a empathetic setting, in which
players offer the minimum amount they are ready to accept, so
p¼q and strategies are defined by a single parameter, and an
independent setting in which both parameters evolve indepen
dently. With this notation, an interaction between players i and j,
with i taking the role of proposer and j the responder, takes place
as follows ( DPOij and DP
R
ji denote the increment of payoff for
i and j, respectively):
DPOij ¼
1 pi if piZqj
0 if pioqj
(
ð1Þ
DPRji ¼
pi if piZqj
0 if pioqj
(
ð2Þ
Every time step, the lattice is swept and every player partici
pates in an Ultimatum game with each of her neighbors. Regard
ing the assignation of roles (proposer and responder) between the
players, two settings have been considered: non random (nR), in
which the focal agent plays as proposer (and therefore she plays
as responder when her neighbors are the focal agents), and
random (R), in which roles are assigned randomly in every
encounter, so that the same individual can act twice as proposer
or responder. In the latter case, the expectation for the payoff
increment of i after a double interaction with j is
EðDPijÞ ¼
1 piþpj if piZqj and pjZqi
1 pi if piZqj and pjoqi
pj if pioqj and pjZqi
0 if pioqj and pjoqi
8>><
>>:
ð3Þ
In case non random roles are assigned, the previous expectation
becomes the exact payoff after a double (i, j) interaction. The final
payoff is the sum of the increments after playing with all
neighbors.
Subsequently to the games, players update their strategies.
Each individual compares its final payoff with that of its neigh
bors and modify its parameters (pi, qi) according to one of the
following two update rules. The first one, unconditional imitation
(UI), also known as ‘‘imitation of the best’’, stipulates that each
player copies the strategy of the neighbor with highest payoff,
provided it is greater than the player’s. As a result, this is a
deterministic rule. This update procedure was first proposed
by Nowak and May (1992) and has been widely used in the
literature since then. The second rule, proportional imitation, is
defined by having each player i select one neighbor j at random.
Then, provided that the neighbor’s payoff is greater, her strategy2
Table 1
Summary of the variations of the model considered in this study.
Alternative Possible settings Abbrev.
Parameters p, q Empathetic/independent p q/p,q
Role assignment Random/once prop. - once resp. R/nR
Updating rule Unconditional/proportional imitation UI/PI
Noise in the copy With/without noise N/nN
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
Value of p
0
1
2
3
4
Fr
eq
. p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
Value of p
0
2
4
6
8
0 0.2 0.4 0.6
x 10-2 x 10-1
Fig. 1. Observed outcomes with empathetic players (p q). Plots show the final
distribution of offers averaged over 104 realizations. Two major outcomes are
possible: (a) stable coexistence of several offers in the population – only for the
deterministic setting – and (b) mean-field behavior, with p 1=2. Inset (c) shows
a peculiar behavior that appears in large networks with setting {UI/R/nN} and is
characterized by fixation of low p strategies in some realizations.will be copied with probability
Pij ¼
Pj Pi
2maxfki,kjg
ð4Þ
where ki and kj are the number of neighbors of i and j respectively.
The denominator takes this form in order to ensure that Pijr1.
This update rule is also known as ‘‘replicator rule’’, since in the
thermodynamical limit it results in the replicator equation, as
shown by Helbing (1992) and Schlag (1998). Again, this rule is a
common choice in research on evolutionary games. In addition, to
address the effect of noise or mistakes, we have considered two
scenarios, with or without noise in the copy of parameters (noise
and no noise, abbreviated as N and nN). Noise has been implemented
by adding to the copied parameters a random value uniformly
distributed in [ 0.001, 0.001] (not necessarily the same for p and q).
The choice of the above rules is due to the fact that they have not
been considered in the literature about the spatial Ultimatum game.
Indeed, Page et al. used a Moran like process (Moran, 1962; Roca
et al., 2009b) in which all neighbors try to take over the focal one
and succeed with probability proportional to their payoffs. There
fore, it is important to consider additional update rules that can add
to our knowledge on this problem as it has been shown that in 22
games, they can lead to very different outcomes of the evolution
(Roca et al., 2009a,b).
The final stage of a time step is that all payoffs are reset to
zero. Therefore, there is neither memory nor information about
neighbors strategies in the model here presented. Simulations
were run for a maximum of 4104 generations, stopping before if
equilibrium was reached. A typical outcome of single simulations
was the convergence of all the population to the same strategy,
with all p and q values located within a narrow interval corre
sponding to the magnitude of noise. In order to obtain frequency
distributions for that final strategy averages were taken for 104
independent realizations. A summary of the different conditions
explored in this work is given in Table 1.3. Results: empathetic players
As stated above, this setting is characterized by the fixed
relationship p¼q. On a well mixed population, the constraint that
p¼q leads to offers close to one half of the total reward (p¼1/2)
(Page and Nowak, 2002; Sa´nchez and Cuesta, 2005). In other
words, empathy promotes fair behaviors. Our aim here is to
contrast this result when players interact no longer with all the
population but with a small, highly structured neighborhood.
The main result of our simulation is that for almost all the
variations of our model, the population converges towards the well
mixed population behavior, that is p¼1/2 (Fig. 1b). In particular, this
is the case as soon as any source of noise is introduced, either
through random role assignment, proportional imitation or noise in
the copy of parameters. Due to finite size effects, the final value in
small populations (size 1010) can be rather smaller than 1/2 if no
noise is introduced, as will be explained below. Nevertheless, the
convergence of the population to a unique offer is a general feature.
The only exception to the above outcome takes place for the setting{UI/nR/nN}, when there is no source of stochasticity in evolution. In
this case, many different values of parameter p coexist in the
population in a stable way (Fig. 1a). From a spatial point of view,
stable clusters of individuals with the same p are formed that can
neither invade nor be invaded by their neighbors. Thus, coexistence
is a result of the spatial structure of the population: In fact, we
checked that if the UG takes place on random networks (even with
homogeneous degree), the coexistence of offers is lost.
In order to understand why random roles, proportional imitation
and noise prevent coexistence and lead to the well mixed result, we
will follow Page et al. (2000) and consider a 33 cluster (or,
alternatively, cross like configurations) of individuals with a differ
ent strategy than that of the surrounding population. By comparing
the payoff of every player it is possible to predict (exactly in the
deterministic setting and approximately in the stochastic ones)
what will happen to the cluster. Let ppop be the offer parameter of
the population and pcl that of the players in the cluster. Let us
denote by a, b, c, d the players involved in the interaction cluster
environment, with d at the corner of the cluster, c at the lateral of it
and a,b outside the cluster in contact with c and d, respectively, as
shown in Fig. 2. We will consider several cases separately in what
follows, in order to assess the effects of the different types of
stochasticity we are studying.
3.1. Cluster analysis: deterministic case {UI/nR/nN}
We will begin by analyzing the deterministic situation, i.e.,
when there are no sources of noise in the model. First, consider a
cluster of players whose p is further from 1/2 than the surround
ing population, pcloppopr1=2. When an individual plays with
other of the same type two deals are made (as proposer and
responder) and both players get payoff equal to 1. However, since
pcloq1, distinct players at the interface only accept the deal when
the player in the cluster acts as responder. According to Eq. (3),
the payoffs for every player are (see Fig. 2a)
Pa ¼Pb ¼ 3þð1 ppopÞZ3:5
Pc ¼ 3þppopr3:5
Pd ¼ 2þ2ppopr3
Note that the individual at the center of the cluster, as well as
those inside the surrounding population get a total payoff equal
to 4. Evolution by unconditional imitation consists of looking for
the neighbor with greatest payoff and imitating it. For players a
and b the richest neighbor is that with payoff 4 inside the3
Fig. 2. Clusters of players evolve in the absence (a) or in the presence (b) of noise (unconditional imitation, non-random roles). Colored players make offers closer to 1/2
than the white ones. Stable coexistence is the expected outcome without noise, while strategies closer to p 1/2 invade the population if noise is added. (a) Deterministic
setting {UI/nR/nN}, (b) Noise {UI/nR/N}. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)population, so their strategy will remain the same. Player c is in
contact with the center of the cluster, whose payoff is equal to 4,
so it will not change either. Finally, the neighbors of player d are b
(richer) and c: Imitation of b will change the strategy of d to the
majority one. As a result, a 33 cluster with pcloppop becomes a
cross shaped structure. In the cross cluster, all individuals are
connected to the central one, who still has payoff equal to 4.
Therefore, the resulting cross cluster is stable.
Always within the deterministic dynamics, consider now the
case when individuals in the cluster have greater p than the
surrounding population, ppopopclr1=2. Now the payoffs become
Pa ¼Pb ¼ 3þpclr3:5
Pc ¼ 3þð1 pclÞZ3:5
Pd ¼ 2þ2ð1 pclÞZ3
Players a, b and c are in contact with individuals of their same type
with payoff 4, so their strategy will not change. Player d best
neighbor is c, that also belongs to the cluster. Hence, the 33 is a
stable configuration. In the same way, it can be shown that a cross
structure is also stable. The conclusion of this analysis is that small
clusters can neither invade nor be invaded, no matter if their p is
greater or lower than that of their surroundings. In consequence,
coexistence is the expected outcome in the deterministic setting.
3.2. Cluster analysis: unconditional imitation with noise {UI/nR/N}
We can now turn to the discussion of the effect of noise. When
there is noise in the system, there will be no more individuals
with exactly the same value of p (note that q is fixed for every
player equal to his p). Even if an individual plays with other of the
same type, their parameters will still be slightly different and as a
result only one deal will be finalized (that in which the player
with greater p acts as proposer). On average, when a playerinteracts with others of the same type half of the deals will be
made as proposer and half as responder; hence, the expected
payoff will be pi=2þð1 piÞ=2¼ 1=2. This result is in contrast with
the case without noise, where players of the same type received a
payoff of 1. This is the main difference between both settings and
has strong consequences in the evolution of offers.
In order to apply the same cluster analysis as before, we will
approximate the payoff between players of the same type by
means of the above expected value. This will give an idea of what
will occur on average. Now the total payoff in the center of the
cluster, as well as inside the population, is 2. As before, let us
begin with lower offer than the surroundings, pcloppopr1=2. In
the absence of noise, the stable configuration for that cluster is
the cross structure. Let it be the starting shape of the cluster, the
payoffs for every player are (see Fig. 2b)
Pa ¼ 3=2þð1 ppopÞZ2
Pc ¼ 1=2þ3ppopr2
Pd ¼ 1þ2ð1 ppopÞZ2
According to these payoffs, player c will imitate a or d and only
the central individual in the cluster will resist. This remaining
individual will disappear in the next generation. Results are the
same if a square cluster is considered.
Now suppose a single individual with parameter pcl greater
than the rest of the population ( ppopopclr1=2). Her total payoff
will then be 4ð1 pclÞZ2 while the payoff of her neighbors will be
4pclr2. In consequence, this strategy will spread and give rise to
a cross cluster (Fig. 2b). Payoffs in the next generation are
Pa ¼ 3=2þpclr2
Pc ¼ 1=2þ3ð1 pclÞZ2
Pd ¼ 1þ2pclr24
Both players a and d imitate c and the cluster with greater p
continues growing. These results show that a strategy closer to
the mean field solution, p¼1/2, is able to invade the population if
noise is present. No coexistence is possible in this setting. The
underlying reason is the intrinsic weakening of clusters when its
members cannot take exactly the same p.3.3. Cluster analysis: random roles {UI/R/nN}
When roles are randomly assigned, the same player can act
twice as proposer or as responder when interacting with the same
neighbor. As a result, stochasticity is introduced in the interaction
between players of any type. The probability of acting twice as
proposer, as well as twice as responder, is 1/4, hence the expected
payoff for a given interaction is
EðDPiÞ ¼ ð14 Þ2DPOi þð12 Þ½DPOi þDPRi þð14Þ2DPRi ¼DPOi þDPRi
which coincides with the case when roles are not random. In turn,
the particular payoff increment for a concrete interaction can be
quite different to this expectation, specially if the players are of
different type (note, for instance, that if the player with lower p
acts twice as proposer the payoff increment for both players is
zero). As a result, the boundaries of a cluster will fluctuate almost
randomly. To study the effect of random roles the same cluster
analysis than before will be used. Now we will pay attention to a
stable cross cluster when it undergoes a boundary perturbation
(Fig. 3). The subsequent evolution of the cluster will be computed
by means of expected payoffs, so it can be seen as the average
behavior of the perturbed cluster.
Let us consider first the case pcloppopr1=2 (cluster further
from 1/2 than the rest of the population). Suppose a new individual
is added at one edge of the cluster (position a). The payoff for a
neighbor outside the cluster is Pb ¼ 3þð1 ppopÞZ3:5, whilst for
the neighbor inside Pc ¼ 2þ2pir3 (payoff for a being lower than
both). Thus, player a imitates d and the cluster reverts on average to
the cross shape. On the other hand, if one of the arms of the cross is
removed (position a) the updated payoff at that position will be
Pa ¼ 3þð1 ppopÞZ3:5, whilst for the player previously in the
middle of the cross Pc ¼ 3þpir3:5 and for the remaining arms
Pd ¼ 1þ3pir2:5. As a consequence, players c and dwill imitate its
neighbors outside the cluster and the cluster will disappear.
In the opposite case, ppopopclr1=2. When the cluster is
enlarged at one arm, the player at that position will get Pa ¼ 1þ
3ð1 pclÞZ2:5, his neighbor outside the cluster Pib ¼ 3þpclr3:5
and the neighbor inside Pic ¼ 2þ2ð1 pclÞZ3. Provided that
pcl41=3 player a imitates b and the cross shape is recovered.Fig. 3. Clusters of players evolving under random role assignment suffer continuous b
with p far from 1/2 (white) disappear, while those closer to 1/2 (colored) behave as meta
(For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referreOn the contrary, if an arm is removed (position a) payoffs will be
Pa ¼Pb ¼ 3þpclr3:5
Pc ¼ 3þð1 pclÞZ3:5
Pd ¼ 1þ3ð1 pclÞZ2:5
Since players a and b have neighbors outside the cluster with payoff
4, this T configuration proves to be stable. However, removal of any
of the remaining elements by further perturbations would result
in its extinction. Hence, the T cluster should be considered as
metastable.
We have thus seen that a majority of players with strategy
close to p¼1/2 is able to invade small clusters of players with
lower p. On the other hand, a small cluster of players closer to
p¼1/2 can hardly invade a population with lower p and boundary
perturbations will make it eventually disappear. In conclusion,
coexistence is not the expected outcome when roles are randomly
assigned. Moreover, metastability gives advantage to players with
higher p when small clusters of similar size interact. This explains
why the most frequent (but not the only one) outcome is fixation
of strategies close to p¼1/2.
3.4. Cluster analysis: proportional imitation {PI/nR/nN}
Finally, let us analyze the case in which the source of noise is
the choice of the neighbor to copy. Under proportional imitation,
a player can adopt the strategy of any of her neighbors with
payoff greater than own. As a result, given a certain configuration
several transitions will be possible with different probabilities. To
make things easier, we will take a qualitative approach and consider
only which configurations are reachable from a given one. Note that
transitions which require a player to imitate the strategy of a
neighbor with lower payoff are not permitted. Payoffs can be
calculated for every configuration as before, and moreover they will
be exact if neither noise nor random roles are considered.
The possible dynamics for a 33 cluster are shown in Fig. 4,
where thick dark arrows are used when there is only a unique
permitted transition (evolution is deterministic in that cases).
Starting with a cluster of players with pcloppopr1=2 the cluster
will fluctuate between 33 and cross configuration, but even
tually will reach T configuration and subsequent extinction. On
the other hand, if ppopopclr1=2 both extinction and spreading
can occur.
In conclusion, when proportional imitation operates no coex
istence in the long term will be observable. Fixation is prone to
occur for strategies with p close to 1/2 since small clusters of
players of this type can spread (with certain probability) into a
population with lower p but not the opposite.oundary perturbations (white thin arrows). In such circumstances, small clusters
stable. Dark thick arrows indicate the average progression of a perturbated cluster.
d to the web version of this article.)
5
Fig. 4. Evolution of clusters through proportional imitation (neither noise nor random roles). Colored players are closer to p 1/2 than white ones. Arrows indicate
permitted transitions between different configurations. Dark thick arrows are used when there is only one available evolutionary pathway. (For interpretation of the
references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 2
Average final offers ( p) and standard deviations ( s) in the empathetic case p q.
High dispersion in setting {UI/nR/nN} is due to stable coexistence of several strategies
in the population. In all the other settings a unique final offer is reached in every
realization. See text for an explanation of high dispersion in setting {UI/R/nN}
size 4040.
Setting Size p s Setting Size p s
{UI/nR/nN} 1010 0.323 0.127 {PI/nR/nN} 1010 0.435 0.034
4040 0.323 0.127 4040 0.482 0.008
{UI/nR/N} 1010 0.500 0.004 {PI/nR/N} 1010 0.500 0.001
4040 0.500 0.004 4040 0.500 0.001
{UI/R/nN} 1010 0.397 0.064 {PI/R/nN} 1010 0.434 0.035
4040 0.405 0.150 4040 0.482 0.008
{UI/R/N} 1010 0.500 0.004 {PI/R/N} 1010 0.500 0.005
4040 0.500 0.004 4040 0.500 0.0053.5. Size and connectivity effects
In order to shed further light on the spatial Ultimatum game,
we have also studied the effect of the system size and the
connectivity of the lattice. A summary of the results for simula
tions with different settings and network sizes is given in Table 2.
Finite size effects can be observed in small networks without
noise, while the results become size independent when noise is
added. This is due to the depletion of individuals with high p at
early steps of the evolution: starting with a population with
random p’s the maximum mean payoff does not correspond to
individuals with p¼1/2 but those with p¼1/3 (Sinatra et al.,
2009). As a result, individuals with p close to 1/2 are usually
removed in small populations and cannot be recovered if noise is
absent. As one can expect, this effect becomes specially relevant
as connectivity increases and the real payoffs approach the well
mixed limit (for instance, mean final offer reduces from 0.397
to 0.321 when increasing connectivity from 4 to 8 neighbors,
setting {UI/R/nN}). One exception to this rule would be the setting{UI/nR/nN}. Since coexistence is allowed for this setting the final
configuration gets fixed early in the evolution. As a result, the
mean final offer is close to the best one at initial steps, p 1=3.
Another peculiar feature dependent on size is observed for
setting {UI/R/nN} (Fig. 1c). If the system is large enough a fraction
of realizations ends with the fixation of very low offer strategies.
Alternatively, for small networks all final fixed offers are distributed
around the mean. This phenomenon also manifests itself in the
standard deviation of the final p distribution (Table 2), which
increases dramatically with system size. The reason for this behavior
is not obvious, but we believe that it is related to the survival of low
p clusters at initial steps of the evolution, in certain places of a large
network and under favorable initial conditions. As it was seen before
for this setting, once clusters are big enough their dynamics become
dominated by random fluctuations, what gives a chance for fixation
of that low p clusters.
4. Results: independent thresholds
In the second part of our simulation program, we study the
spatial Ultimatum game when players can independently choose
their offers and their acceptance thresholds. The rational game
theory prediction for this situation is the following: Given that the
responder always receives greater payoff by accepting a deal than
by rejecting it, the acceptance threshold q will tend to zero and all
offers will be accepted. As a consequence, proposers will offer the
smallest amount possible. In conclusion, game theory predicts
that both parameters, p and q, will tend to zero. This is indeed the
observed outcome for the evolutionary Ultimatum game in a
well mixed population (Page et al., 2000). In this section, we will
see how this result changes on a spatial setting. As in the previous
section for empathetic players, here we will explore the station
ary outcomes of the evolution when different evolutionary rules
are considered. For this purpose, the comparison with the much
simpler case of empathetic players will give insight into the
causes behind the observed differences.6
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Fig. 5. Observed outcomes with independent p and q. Black line corresponds to
the distribution of offers p and red line to the acceptance thresholds q, averaged
for 104 realizations. The four characteristic outcomes are (a) stable coexistence,
only for the deterministic setting; (b) rational outcome, dotted lines represent
distribution at intermediate time steps; (c) bell-shaped p40 with q close to zero
– typical of small networks – and (d) ‘‘quasiempathetic’’ behavior, the most
frequent outcome. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure
legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Table 3
Average final offers ðpÞ, acceptance thresholds ðq) and its standard deviations
ðsp and sq , respectively) for different settings and system sizes. High dispersion
in setting {UI/nR/nN} is due to stable coexistence of several strategies in the
population. In all the other settings a unique final offer is reached in every
realization. Quasiempathetic outcome in large networks produces similar values
for p and q and small standard deviations, while rational outcome in {UI/nR/N}
leads to p and q close to zero.
Setting Size p sp q sq
{UI/nR/nN} 1010 0.280 0.127 0.146 0.129
4040 0.184 0.111 0.183 0.129
{UI/nR/N} 1010 0.012 0.029 0.011 0.023
4040 0.015 0.029 0.014 0.024
{UI/R/nN} 1010 0.285 0.087 0.189 0.112
4040 0.354 0.063 0.341 0.076
{UI/R/N} 1010 0.250 0.010 0.245 0.010
4040 0.336 0.009 0.330 0.010
{PI/nR/nN} 1010 0.319 0.080 0.222 0.119
4040 0.404 0.044 0.366 0.089
{PI/nR/N} 1010 0.306 0.081 0.219 0.117
4040 0.401 0.032 0.383 0.065
{PI/R/nN} 1010 0.318 0.081 0.223 0.118
4040 0.405 0.043 0.363 0.093
{PI/R/N} 1010 0.267 0.089 0.221 0.113
4040 0.377 0.028 0.357 0.050Variations on the evolutionary rules give four qualitatively
different outcomes for the game. Representative distributions of
parameters p and q are depicted in Fig. 5 where we have verified
that the simulations have indeed converged to an asymptotically
stationary state. A summary of the results for different settings
and networks is collected in Table 3. We can classify the simula
tion results in four different types:
Coexistence of offers: As in the empathetic case, coexistence
of markedly different strategies is only observed in the setting
{UI/nR/nN} (Fig. 5a). In turn, any source of stochasticity in the
evolution (random roles, proportional imitation, noise) leads to an
homogeneous final population. Coexistence of offers depends on
the formation of stable spatial configurations, and therefore it
cannot be observed if the game takes place on random networks
(even with homogeneous degree).Rational (p, q 0): In a first stage, parameters p and q concen
trate around well defined values far from zero. Afterwards, both
evolve gradually towards zero (Fig. 5b). This behavior is only
observed in the setting {UI/nR/N}, i.e. when noise is introduced
into an otherwise deterministic setting. Proportional imitation
and random role assignment prevent the population from reach
ing the rational solution.
Bell shaped p40 with q close to zero: Offer parameter p takes a
bell shaped distribution with values greater than zero. On the
other side, distribution of the acceptance threshold q takes
significant values at zero (Fig. 5c). That means that in some
realizations the population fixes the rational value for q. This
outcome is typical of small networks when either noise or
random roles are absent (excluding the aforementioned settings
with rational and coexistence outcomes). Specifically it can be
observed in 1010 systems with settings {UI/R/nN}, {PI/R/nN},
{PI/nR/N} and {PI/nR,nN}.
Bell shaped ‘‘quasiempathetic’’ ( p q40): The population
takes p and q greater than zero, with q just slightly below p
(Fig. 5d). The distance between p and q is typically on the order of
0.02, so the final population resembles an empathetic one. This is
the most frequent outcome, that appears in large networks
(4040) whenever proportional imitation or random roles are
taken into account (with or without noise). It also appears in
small networks if noise and random roles are combined (inde
pendently of unconditional or proportional imitation).4.1. An analytical argument for the case of quasiempathetic
behavior
Among the four different types of behavior summarized above,
the most common outcome is quasiempathetic behavior, namely
the fixation of a strategy with q very close to p and both greater
than zero. This being the farthest result from rational prediction,
we believe it is worth to analyze it in detail. Our explanation of
this behavior proceeds in two stages: Firstly, we will deal with the
disappearance of rational players in the population after the first
time steps. Subsequently, we will discuss the efficiency of a
quasiempathetic strategy when evolution is driven by local
interactions.
To begin with, we have observed in our simulations the
remarkable fact that rational strategies (p and q close to zero)
are no more found in the population after the first time steps,
despite they can be present in the starting random configuration.
Disappearance of rational strategies takes place not only in small
1010 networks but also in larger 4040 ones. One simple
reason for this phenomenon can be found by looking at the
average payoff of a rational player in a well mixed population.
Assume that the parameters of the players in the population are
uniformly distributed in [0,1], as the initial condition in our
simulations. Since the expected payoff for a player with strategy
p¼q¼0 is equal to the average p in the population, we have that
Pð0,0Þ ¼ 1=2, which in turn coincides with the average payoff in
the population. This means that there will be strategies better
than the rational one and that it will be suppressed when
individuals copy more successful ones. Note that if one considers
the values for p and q uniformly distributed in [0,1/2], the
expected payoff for a rational player becomes Pð0,0Þ ¼ 1=4, while
the average payoff in the population remains equal to 1/2. As a
result, selective pressure against rational strategy is strong and it
will disappear easily even in large populations.
Interestingly, a straightforward consequence of this phenom
enon is that noise is necessary for a rational outcome to occur.
This is just because only noise can recover individuals with low p
and q later in the evolution. Since changes introduced by noise are7
very small, evolutionary conditions must be such that gradual
evolution through small changes is possible. As we will see later,
this is not the case if random roles or proportional imitation are
introduced.
Having dealt with the early disappearance of rational players, we
will now focus on explaining why quasiempathetic strategies are
successful in the spatial UG. Our approach relies on the fact that,
when spatial structure is present and connectivity is low, competi
tion among players takes place at a local level. Accordingly, a
successful player is one that defeats its neighbors, no matter how
optimal his strategy is from a whole population point of view.
Consider the following example: a player with q¼0 will accept
every offer of his neighbors, whose p’s we will assume lower than
1/2 and q40. As a result, that player will obtain payoff p in an
interaction, while his neighbor will receive 1 p4p. This gives a
payoff advantage to the neighbor, so if the game took place only
between these two players the rational strategy would be beaten. It
is clear that this argument loses applicability when the number of
neighbors increases and the final payoff becomes less and less
dependent on the result of a single interaction, so that in the limit of
a large, totally connected population the optimal strategy is indeed
the rational one. Nevertheless, for the square lattices here consid
ered, it can be assumed that local competition between pairs of
players is relevant. Accordingly, a ‘‘one against one’’ approach should
give a good approximation of the processes that drive evolution in
these populations, and we will stick to it in what follows, taking
back the issue of multiple neighbors afterwards.
Firstly, assume that qrpr1=2 for all players in the popula
tion. It is an observable fact that this condition becomes fulfilled
very soon in the evolution. Let us focus on player i and define the
distances a¼ 1=2 pi, b¼ pi qi and c¼qi. Neighbor j’s strategies
can be classified according to the order relationships between
their thresholds pj, qj and those of player i (see Fig. 6). We now
want to find the optimal combination for pi and qi in order to
achieve greater payoff than one’s neighbor, provided that players
lack any knowledge about their neighbors.
Player i receives lower payoff than her neighbor j in three
cases: If both thresholds pj and qj are (1) greater than pi or (2) just
between pi and qi, or if (3) pi4pj4qi and qjoqi. Since in the
beginning of the game thresholds are randomly assigned accord
ing to a uniform distribution, it is reasonable to assume (at initial
steps) that the probability of pj and qj belonging to a certain
interval is proportional to the length of that interval. Taking into
account the above definition of the intervals a, b and c togetherFig. 6. Classification of the possible strategies of neighbor j with respect to the
thresholds of considered player i. Each strategy is represented by two open circles
connected with a vertical line. Upper circle indicates the value of p and lower
circle that of q. Strategies marked with an asterisk are suboptimal, since only one
deal per interaction is made.with the aforementioned constraint qrpr1=2, the probability
that player i loses can be expressed as the function
Fða,b,cÞ ¼ 4a2þ4b2þ8bc ð5Þ
On the other hand, player i gets greater payoff than j if (1) both
thresholds of j are below qi, (2) pj4pi and pi4qj4qi, or if
(3) pj4pi and qjrqi. The same considerations as before for the
probability of each combination give the following function for
the probability that player i beats his neighbor:
Gða,b,cÞ ¼ 4c2þ8abþ8ac ð6Þ
The best strategy for i must maximize G(a, b, c) and minimize
F(a, b, c) subject to the constraints aþbþc¼1/2 and 0ra,b,c
r1=2. By writing b¼ 1=2 a c, function G becomes Gða,cÞ ¼
4a 8a2þ4c2, and it must be maximized in the triangle
0rar1=2, 0rcrð1=2 aÞ. The solution is a¼b¼0, c¼1/2. In a
similar fashion, it can be checked that function F reaches its
minimum for the same values. The conclusion of this analysis is
that optimal strategy in a ‘‘one against one’’ game with the
considered assumptions is p¼q¼1/2, what resembles the empa
thetic outcome.
We must now discuss how this result changes if we recall that
players interact with more than one neighbor and payoffs are the
sum of all that interactions. From a phenomenological point of
view, it means that player i can also lose against neighbor j if it
performs very poorly in the interaction with the rest of his
neighbors. Indeed, this is the case when qi is very high or pi is
very low, what results in player i making only one deal in every
interaction. It is reasonable to assume that this kind of strategies
are undesirable when multiple neighbors are considered, and
players that make two deals in the interaction perform better
than those leading to only one deal. Admittedly, in a quasiempa
thetic situation, most individuals will make only one deal per
interaction, but we believe that this effect will have less influence
than using a strategy that from the very beginning would
preclude one of the two exchanges (even for non quasiempa
thetic players). Within this assumption, functions F and G are
recalculated excluding the two strategies (marked with an aster
isk in Fig. 6) for which only one deal is typically accepted. Thus
these functions become
Fða,b,cÞ ¼ 4b2þ8bc ð7Þ
Gða,b,cÞ ¼ 8abþ8ac ð8Þ
The solution that maximizes G and minimizes F is a¼c¼1/4, b¼0,
that corresponds to strategy p¼q¼1/4, and once again, quasiem
pathetic strategies are successful. We stress that we only have
explicitly considered interaction between players i and j (local
approach), while the effect of having more neighbors is included
in the requisite for making typically two deals in every interac
tion. For comparison with the well mixed setting, note that this
requisite only precludes fixation of strategies that perform very
poorly from a global point of view. Although it can seem very
simplistic, this approximation is qualitatively consistent with
experimental results and provides intuitive explanations to the
exceptional observed outcomes. As a final note, observe that local
analysis also predict early disappearance of rational strategies
(p¼q¼0), as we had already seen above in a well mixed context.
4.2. Discussion of other outcomes
As it has been just explained, two processes take place at the
first steps in evolution that determine the fate of the whole
population. First, strategies close to the rational one disappear, as
a result of being less fit than the average. Second, quasiempa
thetic strategies, with q similar to p and both located somewhere8
between 1/4 and 1/2, take advantage and spread through the
population. This is indeed the final outcome in most of the cases,
when no further evolution is possible. Nevertheless, differences
appear in case unconditional imitation is chosen as the updat
ing rule and roles are not randomly assigned. Finite size effects
can also be found under certain circumstances and should be
discussed as well.
Total lack of stochasticity (setting {UI/nR/nN}) results in coex
istence of several strategies in the final population. As in the
empathetic case, this is due to the formation of spatial clusters
that can neither invade nor be invaded, and the same arguments
that explained it before are valid here again. Perturbations
induced by random role assignment and proportional imitation
destroy spatial clusters and make coexistence inviable.
The only setting for which the rational outcome can be
observed is {UI/nR/N}. This setting is the result of adding noise
in the copy of parameters into an otherwise deterministic system.
In fact, this is the only case in which evolution after fixation of a
quasiempathetic behavior can occur. Firstly, it is straightforward
to see that once a single strategy has been fixed, noise is
necessary in order to let it evolve. Secondly, evolution of qua
siempathetic strategies is not easy at all, since it requires a series
of gradual processes that are very weakly selected for and, as a
result, strongly sensitive to stochastic perturbations. Specifically,
evolution from a homogeneous population towards the rational
strategy requires the appearance of an individual with q lower
than the rest. This individual receives greater payoff than her
neighbors and gives rise to a cross cluster (in average, provided
that p41=5). But the same noise that allowed this individual to
appear produces variations inside the cluster that are of the same
order of magnitude than the differences between the cluster and
the population. As a result, there is not evolution as a cluster, but
as individual players that successively appear. This slow, gradual
evolution can take place in spatially ordered, almost deter
ministic systems, but is suppressed as soon as stochastic pertur
bations (induced by random roles or proportional imitation) are
present. It can be therefore concluded that the quasiempathetic
outcome is robust against noise, while the coexistence of strate
gies resulting from deterministic setting {UI/nR/nN} is unstable
and evolves to the rational solution if imitation is not exact.
The last alternative outcome consists on a bell shaped dis
tribution of offers greater than zero with acceptance thresholds
close to zero. It only appears in small networks, where it is
possible that no quasiempathetic individual exists at the begin
ning of the simulation. Indeed, we have checked that if a small
number of players with p q 1=4 are introduced in the starting
configuration the standard quasiempathetic distribution is
obtained as final outcome. Quasiempathetic outcome is also the
natural one in small networks if noise and random roles are
combined (settings {UI/R/N} and {PI/R/N}). In those cases random
role assignment induces fluctuations that result in slow fixation
of strategies. This provides enough time so that noise generates
quasiempathetic players.
Regarding the effect of connectivity, results do not suffer major
changes when eight neighbors instead of four are considered in
the game. Quasiempathetic behavior remains, although the mean
final values for p and q decrease slightly ( p ¼ 0:309, q ¼ 0:284 in
setting {PI/R/N}). This result is in agreement with those observed
in different networks (Page et al., 2000; Kuperman and Risau
Gusman, 2008). At the same time, as connectivity increases a
growing fraction of realizations ends with acceptance threshold
close to zero. This deviation from quasiempathetic behavior is
easy to explain, provided that higher connectivity reduces local
competition (and therefore our local approach above ceases to
hold). In any case, connectivity must be considerably higher than
eight so that this effect becomes relevant.5. Conclusions
We have studied in detail the Ultimatum game on a spatial
setting, considering different update rules for the dynamics and
introducing noise or randomness effects in several manners. Our
simulations show that for a vast majority of settings (combinations
of update rules, noise sources and one or two parameter strategies)
evolution leads to the emergence of altruism, with offers and
acceptance thresholds much larger than zero. Thus, empathetic
players, who offer their own minimum acceptable amount, almost
always evolve to fair offers, with values close to a 50 50 split. The
only situation in which this outcome does not arise is when the
evolution is fully deterministic, i.e., under unconditional imitation
with no noise. Furthermore, when the two parameters p and q are
let to evolve independently, in most occasions they collapse to very
close values for most cases, i.e., quasiempathetic behavior emerges
spontaneously. This is a very interesting result because it resembles
behaviors often found in experiments, above all regarding the offer
(acceptance thresholds are in general significantly smaller). In this
respect, let us note that a distribution of offers and thresholds very
similar to the experimental ones was found for several combinations
of dynamics (mostly for proportional imitation) and noise, but only
for small systems. This suggests that the values observed in human
populations might have arisen from evolution in small groups where
competition is limited. On the other hand, the values we find for p
and q in the quasiempathetic case are similar to those found by Page
et al. (2000) for a different dynamics although, as we do not have
data for the distribution of their values, we cannot take the
comparison any further. Nevertheless, we believe that the dynamics
in that previous work would most likely lead to similar distributions,
in view of the role played by noise we have discussed above. In any
event, the fact that the mean values are similar speaks in favor of the
robustness of the result, in so far as it is only weakly dependent on
the dynamics (it changes qualitatively only for special choices of
update rules and noise).
Along the paper, we have been able to provide explanations for
the simulation results using analytical arguments. Thus, for
empathetic players we have shown that using the stability of
square and cross clusters one can predict the final outcome of the
evolution in the different dynamical scenarios. More importantly,
we have also succeeded in developing an approximation to the
case of two independent parameters for the strategies. Our results
show that the convergence process can be understood in terms of
a quick suppression of rational strategies followed, in a local (one
or only a few neighbors) context, by the successful emergence of
quasiempathetic players. Our approximation predicts that the
offers should be between 1/4 and 1/2 of the total amount to share,
values which are consistent with those reported in human
experiments. This result agrees also with the finding that practi
cally all dynamics lead to the emergence of a unique strategy
throughout the population, coexistence being only possible in
very few situations. While it is by no means the case that humans
have all the same behavior in Ultimatum game experiments, we
believe that the range of offers found through research all over
the world is not that large as compared to the population. On the
other hand, as was discussed in the Introduction, cultural effects
could account for the coexistence of different values among
cultures, while the individuals’ response is very similar within
monocultural groups (as is found, for instance, with European and
US university students, whose range of variability is much smaller
(Henrich et al., 2004).
We believe that the fact that quasiempathetic behavior is the
generic outcome of the evolutionary, spatial Ultimatum game, is a
relevant and non trivial one. Indeed, when empathy is imposed
on the individuals from the beginning (by setting p¼q as a fixed
condition), evolution generically leads to fairness with or without9
a spatial structure, as was shown by Page and Nowak (2002).
Therefore, the spatial Ultimatum game does not add anything
new. On the contrary, in the case in which the two parameters
evolve independently, they first converge to similar levels
because of a fast primary evolutionary process and, subsequently,
quasiempathetic players retain offers much greater than zero as a
consequence of a lack of later evolution. Indeed, if gradual
evolution through small changes were effective, as it occurs for
unconditional imitation with noise, the population will drift away
from a fair split towards the rational solution with almost zero
offers. Only this subtle two stage process leads to the emergence
of fairness.
It is also important to put our conclusions in the context of
findings on other networks. Our results are in contrast with those
obtained by Kuperman and Risau Gusman (2008) on small world
networks, as we observe fair behavior while they did not. We
believe that the convergence to the rational behavior they observe is
due to the destruction of the spatial structure (and hence of clusters)
by the long range links. On the other hand, the results on complex
networks reported by Sinatra et al. (2009) agree with the ones we
are presenting here at least as far as the average values of offers and
acceptance thresholds are concerned and for the case of propor
tional imitation. In their system, however, acceptance thresholds
tend to be not so close to offers, and therefore their agents are less
quasiempathetic; in any event, the results are qualitatively similar, a
remarkable conclusion in view of the differences among the net
works studied in both works and of the influence that the type of
network has on symmetric 22 games (Roca et al., 2009a,b).
To conclude, the picture that is beginning to emerge from our
work and the previous ones is that the Ultimatum game on
structured population is very robust under changes of the dynamics
or the network of connections. The generic result is the appearance
of fair behavior, with individuals that are quasiempathetic to some
extent, and with little or no variability of strategies within the group.
Therefore, as well mixed populations are hard to find in actual
situations, and particularly so within humans, these results suggest
that experiments should always show fair behavior because of the
structure of the population, be it social or spatial. A word of caveat is
in order here regarding the influence of the size of the groups as
discussed in the text, that may lead to somewhat different out
comes, including much lower acceptance thresholds. This must be
taken into account when applying this kind of models to non
human animals, particularly primates, where groups are not big and
therefore effects as those described could be relevant. This conclu
sion paves the way to further studies that try to combine biological
evolutionary dynamics with cultural influences, as to provide a more
complete picture of the emergence of fairness.Acknowledgments
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